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Abstract:
This paper presents a classification of economic thought based on the perception of 
time of its authors that seems to dra� a methodological anarchism. It uses the tra�
ditional distinction bet�een discontinuism – continuism of time; but distinguishes 
bet�een discontinuity in the form of a constant breaking of time or discontinu�
ity in the form of a foreseeable breaking of time; and bet�een continuism based 
on the past (conservatism), continuism based on the present (creative present or 
non�utilitarianism), and continuism based on the future (utilitarian progressism). 
Finally, the author tries to seek some reality underlying all those rhetorical images.
Keywords: Time in economics, methodology of economics, progress in eco�
nomics, utilitarianism
Resumen:
Este artículo presenta una clasificación del pensamiento económico basado en la 
percepción del tiempo de sus autores que inicialmente parece se prueba de la ex�
istencia de un “anarquismo metodológico”. 
El artículo usa la distinción tradicional entre discontinuismo�continuismo del 
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tiempo; pero distingue entre discontinuidad en forma de ruptura constante del 
tiempo o discontinuidad en forma de ruptura previsible del tiempo; y entre con�
tinuidad basada en el pasado (conservadurismo), continuidad basada en el pre�
sente (presente creativo o no utilitarista) y continuidad basada en el futuro (utili�
tarismo progresista). Finalmente, el autor intenta buscar la realidad que subyace 
a todas esas imágenes retóricas, alejándose de la hipótesis inicial del anarquismo 
metodológica. 
Palabras clave: Tiempo en la economía, metodología de la economía, progreso 
en la economía, utilitarismo
1. Introduction
Pantaleoni (1904, 4) compared scientific progress to the increasing 
size of a sno�ball, rolling do�n a mountain slope, gathering more 
sno�. Conversely, �ith their thesis of incommensurability, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend rejected this linear conception of scientific development, 
�hich supposes gro�th by accumulation, �ithout conflicts or revo�
lutions. Scientific progress, Khun says, evolves through periods of 
“normal science” alternating �ith periods of “revolutionary science”. 
Normal science is a conservative enterprise that Kuhn characterised 
as an activity of puzzle resolution; it only enters into a revolutionary 
period �hen a promising alternative paradigm emerges. This is not to 
say that both paradigms are compared �ith the results of observation. 
That comparison could only be made if �e could use a language inde�
pendent of the paradigms in �hich �e register the results of the ob�
servations. The change of paradigm is similar to a change of Gestalt. 
Given a particular problem, the language used �ithin t�o different 
paradigms can lead to a divergence bet�een the type of ans�ers that 
are considered acceptable.
Ho�ever, as Moulines and Laudan said, and contrary to �hat Kuhn 
suggested, there comes a time �hen the coexistence of rival research 
traditions is the rule, not the exception (Díez & Moulines 1997, 30�
47). Scientific traditions are not “dominant”; they do not impose 
themselves over different periods of time. In particular, in social sci�
ences, ghettos and “heterodox theories” have been created. Since they 
do not share the same assumptions and hypotheses, they become iso�
lated from each other. Besides, theories contain elements that deter�
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mine the contents of experience, and defenders of different theories 
live in different experimental �orlds (Whe�ell 1847). Scientists in�
variably interpret the experimental discoveries �ith the aid of some 
theory (Duhem 1962, 32)1.
In this apparent methodological anarchism, in economics – and, prob�
ably in other sciences – theorists suffer from a suspicion that main�
stream science uses methods of persuasion, supported by Po�er – be 
it political, economical or mediatic � to eliminate all elements critical 
of the dominant paradigm as a �hole; or, even �orse, it translates the 
criticisms into an orthodox language, deleting them as a solvent of 
orthodox rhetoric2. As Lakatos told us, Kuhn’s theory indeed implies 
that scientific truth depends on Po�er (Lakatos & Musgrave 1970, 
205). Friedman or Stigler (1950, 392) already said that the success of 
theories is measured in terms of their acceptance by the most impor�
tant economists3. In this sense, Nietzsche (2003) and Foucault (2007) 
conception of genealogy and the archeological method questions the 
emergence of philosophical and social beliefs and looks beyond the 
ideologies in question for the conditions of their possibility �ithin 
current po�er relations. 
Ho�ever, if �e put it into �ords the intertheory differences �e could 
reduce this suspicion. The person �ho consents to put even his �ill 
for po�er into �ords is accepting beforehand a certain equality �ith 
his interlocutor and, in that sense, he begins to move a�ay from con�
flict, since conflict is exercised against “�hat makes us different from 
the other”, �hile language discovers “the same as the other” (Savater 
1 Furthermore, �e cannot forget that hypotheses are collections of enunciations the truth 
of �hich cannot be empirically determined. Campbell referred to the second collection of 
enuciations belonging to a theory, calling it a dictionary for hypothesis. The enunciations 
of the dictionary relate the terms of the hypothesis to the enunciations �hose empirical 
truth can be determined. But the theorist’s imagination is only restricted by the requisites 
of internal consistency and deductibility of experimental la�s. Once formulated, the test 
for the success of a theory is its fertility as a creator of ne� correlations (Campbell 1957, 
122). In an influential essay, Rudolf Carnap (1995) restaured Campbells’ conception of 
scientific theories as the “hypothesis�plus�dictionary”.
2  For an interesting  book on ne� directions and criticisms of economic methodology, 
see Backhouse (1994).
3 Stigler considered that changes in theories do not necessarily imply a conceptual 
progress, judged in retrospect. The criteria for the acceptance of scientific theories, ac�
cording to him, are generality, manageability and congruence �ith casual observance. For 
an interesting recent book on different visions of progress in economic science, see Boehm 
et.al. (2002).
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1995, 37).
With that purpose in mind, �e intend to propose a classification 
of economic thought – and in consequence philosophical or social 
thought as �ell – �hich is more inclusive than that of Pantaleoni`s 
style. Our objective is to demonstrate the mental fertility of the pro�
posed classification. A classification is more natural if the concepts 
that it constitutes are more fertile scientifically (Mosterin 1984, 18). 
To formalize a family of connected concepts is a �ay of making their 
meaning explicit (Suppes 1988). Nevertheless, the fact that there ex�
ist a theories frame�ork and a family similitude does not mean that 
science consists only of academic divisions. The construction of theo�
retical frame�orks based on individual theories is related to the prob�
lem of the interpreting scientific �orks, to bring to the forefront and 
identify the underlying abstract structures. Theories not only reduce 
one into another, they also approach each other (Moulines 1982, 53�
60) and if there exists at least one extension of overlapping and shared 
criteria, it is possible to compare alternative theories (Suppe 1974, 
211). As Feyerabend (1970) told us, to promote scientific progress 
the scientific community must be able to understand and compare 
many totally different theories. The competition bet�een theories is 
in itself creative, enriching our comprehension of the �orld. 
2. Proposed classification 
Our proposal is based on an element traditionally used as a classifier: 
Time. If, as Mc Closkey (1994) says, economy is a form of rhetoric, 
the psychological personal experience of time used by “rhetoricians” 
determines the images they seek to persuade �ith and the ones they 
find most suggestive. This description not only consists of a descrip�
tion of phenomena (Husserl 1990) neither on a hermeneutic inter�
pretation capable of a form of scientific positivity (Heidegger 1996). 
Not only do �e need to describe reality so as to narrate, but also 
to produce meaning through the reconstruction of the plot and the 
emergence of different connotations. Then, �e interpret human ac�
tion � and history � as a self�explained text and reality as able to be 
grasped in the present by the individuals (Zubiri 1998). The temporal 
character of human experience is emphasized in this case (Ricoeur 
1983); and �e can even go so far as to include not only memory but 
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also oblivion, as a �ay of resistance (Vovelle 1985), and intention or 
concentration as a �ay of recollecting true�life experiences. Then, �e 
may distinguish bet�een historical or ontological time independent 
of any human activity and epistemic or logical time. If there is such a 
difference, then, for the second kind of time to be relevant �e need 
that it tries to represent the first one in the best �ay possible (as some 
Keynesians �ill put it, Madsen 2012). 
In particular, �e are going to use the traditional distinction bet�een 
continuism – discontinuism of time, a dichotomy that is more fruitful 
than the starting points habitually used (see the graphic).  
As a �hole, �e can say that the common idea of theories based on 
time discontinuity is that they consider that man arrives and sets out 
from a social and psychological void. The discontinuity, contrary to 
�hat is usually accepted, is a very socially influential time perception, 
given the inherent human desire to break from life’s normal course. 
Discontinuity can be illustrated in the form of a constant breaking 
of time, as is the case in some anarchist doctrines. This is �hat it has 
been called the “antieconomy”, in �hich, to destroy any human hier�
archy, given that for all gro�ing creatures one part of the group must 
be superior to the other, the fear of authority leads their proponents 
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to prefer the constant breaking of history – and, in some occasions, of 
human development – in order not to let the hierarchical construc�
tions crystallise (in some sense, that is the case �ith Proudhon, Ba�
kunin or Kropotkin’s theories that defend the adaptive small groups 
more than any other social construction. 
Another means of discontinuity is the foreseeable breaking of time. 
This is the case �ith the catastrophic crises theories or �ith Marxian 
theory. In this theory, a destructive embryo, Capital, gro�s slo�ly 
until the shell and the system’s o�n equilibrium is expected to be 
broken. As Marx says:  
“If money, according to Augier “comes into the �orld �ith 
a congenital blood�stain on one cheek”, capital comes drip�
ping from head to foot, from every pore, �ith blood and dirt” 
(Marx, 1992)4.
A process of catharsis follo�s this unavoidable destruction. 
If from the ashes emerges a fabulous bird, it is an optimis�
tic theory. If this superstitious magic does not occur, and the 
ashes remain ashes, it augurs dreadful pains. 
If discontinuism appears and sets out from the social or psy�
chological void – either in a repeated �ay or in a foreseeable 
and sudden �ay �, continuity, on the contrary, al�ays sets out 
from an antecedent “existence”. 
In this case, �e pose a distinction bet�een three branches: the first 
based on the past, the second based on the present, and third based 
on the future. Specifically, �e have named each branch, first, conser�
vatism based on utility; second, creative present (non utilitarianism); 
and, third, utilitarian progressism. The systems based on utility are 
finalist, that is to say, they consider that human action has an aim. 
In conservatism theories, the objective is survival: the death instinct 
and the anxiety it creates instigates human action. In the progressist 
case, man seeks an image of the consequences of action over pleasure. 
In both cases, man is acting in order to seek an image of himself, an 
interest that only by chance includes the others in his preferences. 
4 See Http://csf.colorado.edu/psn/marx/Archive/1867�C1/Part8/ch 31.htm
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We shall offer an example for each of these tendencies. In the case 
of conservatism, �e propose David Hume’s theory as an example. In 
that of progressive utilitarianism, the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. 
In the case of non�utilitarianism, Adam Smith`s “asystematic system”5. 
The aim of this �ork is, precisely, to create examples and prototypes 
to understand the underlying ideas of the theories, and this fact per�
haps could make us unfaithful to some ideas of these authors. But �e 
cannot avoid pointing out that these theories seem prototypical, since 
all three of them arrive at a philosophical and economic complete 
social system (something unusual, but also observable in Marx’s fore�
seen breaking of time theory).  
But for that same reason, as �e have found problems in creating a 
prototype for the creative present theory based on Adam Smith’s sys�
tem, �e could enlarge our proposal to Schumpeter’s or Nietzsche’s 
philosophy.
Hume’s tendency to�ards conservatism is based on utility6, although 
it could be imagined to exist a sentimental or romantic conserva�
tism, nearer to anarchism. Ho�ever, the repeated recollection of a 
romantic past reveals an escape from the present and, perhaps, a fear 
of future. It shares, in this sense, some of Hume’s theories, like the 
fear of changes that could break the instable present equilibrium. As 
Hume said,
“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 
�hich succeed each other �ith an inconceivable rapidity, and 
are in a perpetual flux and movement...” (Hume 1964a, 534).
Besides, �e can only extract a mental fiction �hen observing exter�
nal things, a subjective idea formed by impressions. Since, accord�
ing to Hume, the very same perception of reality depends on habit, 
the possibility of transgressing these habit rules causes great anxiety 
5 As Gris�old (1999, 308) says, the Smithian system tries to free politics from the idea 
of system.
6 We are conscious that many authors reject that Hume’s ideas �ere conservatism, and 
some even affirm that his theory �as not based on utility. But �e consider that Hume’s aim 
�as to make social science take part in the idea of utility and that many of his conclusions 
�ere conservatism and, consequently, �e can use it as a prototype.
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that leads him to defend the preservation of these rules.7 In prin�
ciple, it seems that the phenomenalism theory had to defend absolute 
anarchism, as �e could not assure the existence of reality beyond 
the present impression of a particular man. But, as irrealism is psy�
chologically untenable, it ends up defending tradition, from �here 
the relation of ideas that construct language are supposed to have 
emerged8. According to Hume, institutions must be valued for their 
survival: this is “institutional Dar�inism”, in �hich �e become tight�
ly devoted to past social constructions, forged by habit, because �e 
sense in them an implicit kno�ledge that the feeble human reason is 
not al�ays capable of distinguishing9.
Certainly, his conception of the ego created great problems in Hume’s 
philosophy – and also in his social theory and in his definition of free�
dom, a concept he believed not capable of demonstration. In his the�
ory of human action, men are moved by impulses, and their actions 
are compelled by environmental pressures. In his economic theory, it 
is not possible to make interpersonal comparisons of utility nor it is 
possible for a man to make personal comparisons of pleasure bet�een 
the past and the present: an ego �ould be needed to make the com�
parison. So, in the style of Austrian economics, man only can avoid 
the harmful consequences of his actions through a process of trial and 
error that creates habits benefitial to the individual and the preserva�
tion of the species – obviously, �hen this preservation is achieved, an 
a posteriori reflection on one’s survival. 
7 The very same sceptical doubt led him to critical situations: “The intense vie� of these 
manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so �rought upon me, and 
heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no 
opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I? Or �hat? From �hat 
causes do I derive my existence, and to �hat condition shall I return?... I am confounded 
�ith all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imagi�
nable, inviro`d �ith the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv`d of the use of every member 
and faculty... “ (Hume 1964a, 548).
8 In fact, although on his philosophical path Hume started at scepticism, in the end he 
developed a constructive philosophy. Although anti�rationalist, in the sense that it does not 
cope �ith contractual theories, it �as not at all irrationalist. García Roca (1981) has tried 
to free Hume’s epistemology from sceptic interpretations; Tasset (1999) tried the same 
�ith his moral and political philosophy. Hume’s theory has a more systematic and unitar�
ian character than has been claimed by the interpretations that accuse it of naïve scepticism 
and being a dead�end. Not even Hume considered himself a sceptic (Salas Ortueta 1967, 
148). For different interpretations of Hume, see Do� (2002).
9 For that reason, in the attempt to construct a full science of human behaviour, the “His�
tory of Great Britain”, apparently a �ork exclusively of historical interest, also is included 
in the system, as it seeks the past in history. See Norton (1965).
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Hume’s conception of time is similar to �hat some have called 
“Greco�Latin or Dionysian conception”. This mentality is catastrophic 
and stresses the fact that man is al�ays returning to the same point, to 
the beginning, al�ays seeking the same pleasures and making, in his 
�ay, identical mistakes. We are enjoying ourselves “over the remains 
deceased” and, after that joy, there al�ays is a touch melancholy and 
absurdity. As �e are continually resuscitating from the oblivion of 
the past, man can repeat the habit �ithout a consciousness of having 
made a mistake. Time has a circular shape and there is no progress in 
human �ell�being because, from the pleasure that is forgotten �ith 
the generations, there al�ays remains the sentiment of melancholy.
“Fear not. My friends, that the barbarous dissonance of Bac�
chus, and of his revellers, should break in upon this entertain�
ment, and confound us �ith their turbulent and clamorous 
pleasures... but the sun has sunk belo� the horizon; and dark�
ness stealing silently upon us, has no� buried all nature in an 
universal shade... And is the image of our frail mortality for 
ever present �ith you, to thro� a damp on your gayest hours, 
and poison even those joys �hich love inspires!... Yet a little 
moment and these shall be no more. We shall be, as if �e had 
never been. Not a memory of us be left upon earth; and even 
the fabulous shades belo� �ill not afford us a habitation. Our 
fruitless anxieties, our vain projects, our uncertain specula�
tions shall all be s�allo�ed up and lost. Our present doubts, 
concerning the original cause of all things must never, alas! be 
resolved.” (Hume 1964, 200�3).
Man is pursued by a “spectre”, the distrust of “the causes from �hich 
he derives his existence” and of the “condition to �hich he shall re�
turn”. That shado� is so near, just skin�deep, that man holds on to 
the security of �hat has maintained his existence. We admire the past 
because its o�n capacity of existence makes it virtuous. We fear the 
future because it is unkno�n and inexistent. “Accordingly �e find in 
common life, that men are principally concern`d about those objects, 
�hich are not much remov`d either in space or time, enjoying the 
present and leaving �hat is afar off to the care of chance and fortune” 
(Hume 1964b, 206). The consequences of the elimination of space 
are less important than that of the elimination of time in affecting 
imagination. The impossibility for the parts of time to coexist makes 
�hatever distance in time cause a greater interruption in thought 
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than a similar distance in space, something that �eakens the idea 
and, consequently, the passion.  So, �e �orry about the people in 
other land, but not about future generations. We advance, �hile the 
distance to the past is continually increasing and the distance to the 
future reduces. Due to the fact that imagined distance is greater, the 
more historic the past is, the more it is �orshipped; and the farther in 
the future something is, the more it is feared, just as �e fear our o�n 
disappearance and that of matter and time themselves. In fact, Hume 
accepted the eventual disappearance of the universe 
“and its passage, by corruption or dissolution, from one state 
or order to another. It must therefore, as �ell as each individ�
ual form �hich it contains, have its infancy, youth, manhood, 
and old age...”(Hume 1964c, 381).
In Bentham’s case, the conception of time is similar to �hat has been 
called the “Judaeo�Christian conception”, focused on the future and 
on a perfect �orld created by imagination. Man pursues a utopian 
fiction of his o�n mind’s creation. The present is never satisfactory 
�hen �e compare it �ith that future �orld, but man is proud of be�
ing better than past generations �ere. Time is linear, and the theory is 
based on the idea of perfectibility. That is to say, ne� generations do 
not slide into “the best of all possible �orlds”, rather they are suscep�
tible to continual improvement, until the moment �hen the perfect 
�orld arrives. 
Benthamian theory is based not only on methodological individual�
ism, but also on normative individualism, that is to say, it advises us to 
be selfish because, if �e are not, �e risk being left �ith no objects of 
pleasure �hile others, �ith more eagerness, laugh in our faces. Pre�
dominance of self�regard over other impulses is, for Bentham, almost 
an axiom. He underlines the philosophical concept of the necessary 
reference to self.  Whatever man “demands for himself ” can be con�
sidered pleasure. Whatever he avoids, is considered pain (see Stark 
1952c, The Psychology of  Economic Man, 422). According to 
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Bentham, this explains altruistic as �ell as “selfish” actions, so the dif�
ference bet�een altruism – selfishness is not reality based10. Bentham 
did not believe in genuine self�sacrifice. “All men �ho are actuated 
by regard for any thing but self, are fools; those only �hose regard 
is confined to self, are �ise. I am of the number of the �ise” (Stark 
1952, The Psychology of  Economic Man, 426).
But, according to Bentham’s comparative absolutism, to arrive to that 
perfect �orld it is necessary to manipulate individual present plea�
sure as a �ay of achieving a greater future pleasure. In fact, he created 
a ne� religion, that of social utility. His utilitarian heaven on earth 
can only have one canon: the greater happiness of the greater number, fa�
mous phrase pronounced by Francis Hutcheson.
Bentham considers that man is able to classify his pleasures on his 
o�n, �ithout external imposition – in some occasions he does it un�
consciously, as he is the only one �ho kno�s his preferences11. But, 
�hile using the famous statement of Hutcheson, he noticed that noth�
ing prevented his theory from sanctioning the greater number, let’s 
say half plus one, being happy by crushing the smaller number, let’s 
say the half minus one. So, in the end, he broke �ith the utilitarian 
principle to be left, in 1831, �ith the maxim “the greater happiness”, 
that is to say, the social maximisation of happiness. As the last unit of 
pleasure decreases as �e add ne� units (the finding of the decreasing 
marginal utility, discerned by Bentham and other contemporaries12), 
a social criterion can be that of the equalisation of �ealth, and after�
�ards �e must leave man to choose his o�n utilities freely13. 
10  “That �hich in the language of sentimentalism is a sacrifice of private to public interest, 
[is] but a sacrifice of a self�supposed private interest in one shape to a self�supposed private 
interest in another shape: for example, of an interest corresponding to the love of po�er, 
to an interest corresponding to love of reputation: � of that reputation , of �hich po�er is 
the expected fruit” (in Stark (1952c, The Psychology of Economic Man, 428).
11 In this sense, Bentham �as less paternalistic than other progressist utilitarians, like 
John Stuart Mill �ho, despite the fact that he criticised Benthamism, decided to �eigh up 
the sum of pleasures, making a hierarchy of those that he considered of greater value or 
superior and those that he thought vulgar or of less emotional content. Until man has not 
had the opportunity to experience a pleasure, he do not have the freedom to choose it (see 
Mill 1984, 47, and Scarpe 1996).
12 Although some authors affirm that Aristotle had already introduced the marginal utility 
theory, and after�ards this theory �as accepted by Davanzati, Montanari, Galiani, Condil�
lac and Bernouilli (see Vivenza 2001, 143).
13 Ho�ever, �e can distinguish several periods in Bentham’s thought: firstly, he consid�
ered it desireable to equalise �ealth. After the French Revolution, he feared such trans�
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Contrary to �hat happens in Hume’s theory, the main character of 
Bentham’s is a fictitious ego that calculates based on an image of his 
desires and �ho, as he bases his action on an image of the future, can 
compare different men’s pleasures.
We have decided to consider Smith’s theory as representative of a 
creative present. Nevertheless, in many senses, especially �ith re�
spect to entrepreneur theory, Schumpeter’s is nearer this prototype. 
In philosophical terms perhaps Nietzsche’s theory or Husserl’s living 
present better suits this conception of time14.  
Smith tried to criticise all the images that are placed above the pres�
ent. “I have, ho�ever, a mortal aversion to all anticipations” (Mossner 
& Ross 1977, 270)15, he said of himself. Interpreting Smith`s moral 
theory, man, after feeling the pleasure of an ordered �orld, is grateful 
to it �ithout demanding anything in return and this is the first step 
necessary to feel the joy of living. Smith defines pleasure as something 
near gratitude, that is to say, a natural gift that is not necessary to 
summon up, and �hich can be felt in every human gesture, in every 
external or imaginary creation. But the seeking of pleasure, �hich on 
some occasions coincides �ith �hat goes on in the imagination �ith 
others, can anchor man to life, endo�ing him �ith something basic to 
human psychology: a conception of time, a hope for living. 
Without this first impulse of gratitude, human feeling cannot begin. 
As gratitude leads naturally to the search to be corresponded and to 
receive, in return, gratitude, man reflects on his fello� beings and 
makes them the subject of his gratitude. This is the moment �hen, ac�
cording to Smith, moral sentiment emerges, �ith the recognition of 
our equality �ith another being and his seeking to harmonise his feel�
ings �ith our o�n. So, man seeks the affection of people in the pres�
formations in property rights; in the end, �e see a radical Bentham, �ho accepts that 
democratic majorities have to decide. As is �ell kno�n, one �ay of reducing inequalities 
Bentham defended �as the elimination of inheritance from distant relatives.
14  This present implies a direct perceptive contact, a “no�” that retains but seeks the fu�
ture (although Husserl’s intuition is about eidetic essences, universal and ideal structures 
(Huertas�Jourda 1975, 163�195)). A philosophic, legal and economic theory based in this 
present position is found in Trincado (2003).
15  Letter 232, Smith to William Strahan, Canongate, Edimburgh, 20 november 1783.
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ent and creates a relationship �ith current things at the present time. 
Little by little, �ith the memory of the past, man creates a system of 
habitual pleasures and discriminates bet�een external objects: the 
idea of beauty and, in particular, that of utility, gradually emerges. 
But �hen he identifies himself �ith this self�created system, �e can 
say that his o�n creation comes to control him, and this makes him 
lose his sense of identity, i.e. it alienates him.
 
3. How can we save the theory
Toulmin and Hanson underlined the fact that scientists see the phe�
nomena in a different �ay. Follo�ing Wittgenstein’s line (Wittgen�
stein 1953, 193�207), Hanson (1958) distinguished bet�een “see” 
and “see ho�”. Let us consider, he said, the settecentista controversy 
on the movement of the Earth and imagine that Tycho Brahe and Ke�
pler are at the top of a hill looking to the east at da�n. According to 
Hanson, Tycho “sees” the sun rising behind the fixed horizon. Kepler 
“sees” a horizon descending belo� an stationary sun. To see the sun as 
Kepler did implies having made a change of Gestalt. The t�o see the 
same sensorial data, but the disparities sho�n in their descriptions of 
�hat they see is due to the different interpretations they give ex post 
facto to the same sensorial data. Furthermore, neutral observational 
language does not exist since every observation possesses a semantic 
interpretation. Actually, they are not interpreting either, since inter�
preting is a �ay of thinking, an action, �hereas seeing is an involun�
tary state of experience. The action of seeing implies seeing “some�
thing” and, in that sense, a kno�ledge about the conduct of objects. 
So, according to Hanson (1958, 5�24), a scientific conception involve 
a theoretical burden, as, to make phenomena intelligible, �e have to 
consider them through a conceptual outline16.
Popper decided to take the conventional vie� seriously and observed 
that it is al�ays possible to match a specific theory and the data. If 
some data come to be incompatible �ith the consequences of the 
16 As Losee (1972) points out in the brief presentation he makes of Mill (1865) in rela�
tion to the inductive and verificative method, all circumstances together are inferred from 
facts, so �e could only specify accurately a case describing the state of the entire universe 
in a given instant. If �e make an inventory of circumstances, previous hypotheses are re�
quired to choose the relevant data.
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theory, it is possible to adopt a number of strategies to “save” the 
theory. The data can be rejected or absorbed by the theory introduc�
ing auxiliary hypotheses, or modifying the rules of correspondence. 
Although the �ay of fighting against conventionalism, according to 
Popper (1959), is falsationism, letting the theories “being capable 
of revision”, it is al�ays possible to elude the falsationist elements 
through these procedures.
In fact, the falsationist method is not applicable in Kuhn’s to the case 
of the rejection of a paradigm: different groups of scientists see dif�
ferent things �hen they look from the same position and to the same 
direction. Although a ne� paradigm usually absorbs concepts of the 
old paradigm, these borro�ed concepts normally have a different 
meaning. When t�o alternative paradigms coexist, each considers 
their o�n theory superior. As both fields do not share common as�
sumptions or values, �e do not have a logical argument to demon�
strate the superiority of one over the other. Ho�ever, the result of 
the conflict bet�een paradigms is not fortuitous, according to Khun. 
The triumphant paradigm must give a satisfactory treatment to the 
anomalies that have led to the crisis, but the argument must be, in the 
last analysis, one of persuasion17.
This does not mean that those arguments should be irrational, as there 
are rational persuasion methods. If both fields are able to learn ho� 
to translate each others` assertions into their o�n languages, each 
of them can obtain some grade of comprehension from the others` 
ideas, although they may give a different meaning to the theoretical 
terms18.
But, as �e have pointed out, science can also use mutually incom�
patible theories, something Paul Feyerabend (1970) calls theoretical 
pluralism. For example, in physics, paradigms have fallen one after 
17 And, as Empedocle said, �hen the same man argues �ith another in front of the same 
audience, the same speaker is not due to succeed three consecutive times (Lloyd 1977, 
28).
18 As Kuhn (1962) says, a person that studies in a disciplinary matrix implicitly acquires 
some dexterity in interpreting and classifying based on the archetypical examples studied. 
Even different communities �ill disagree about the questions to pose and about �hat must 
be considered an acceptable ans�er; briefly, although they deal �ith the same phenomena, 
they �ill differ in �hat is or is not good science. Scientists, therefore, are something like 
riddle�solvers (Kuhn 1983, 294).
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the other. Ilya Prigogine, 1977’s chemistry Nobel prize, after having 
discovered and described dissipative structures, �ith his insights of 
non�equilibrium thermodynamics, declared the collapse of the ideal 
of classical physics, Einstein’s theories and quantum mechanics in�
cluded. This paradigm, Prigogine says, is based on a time line that 
can go back�ards or for�ards, so it can only be applied to the most 
simple and least interesting cases in the �orld and obliterates, char�
acteristically, the human subject and one of his most specific dimen�
sions: the irreversibility of time. Based on this criticism, Prigogine 
affirms categorically that classical physics alienates man and advocates 
the rene�ed conquest of the “meaning of reality, a question as old 
as humanity and very related to the other question of the meaning 
of the difference and relation bet�een �hat is rational and �hat is 
irrational” (La Nueva Alianza: quoted by Diego Ribes in Feyerabend 
(1970, 12�3)). 
4. From image to reality 
4.1. The living present
We cannot avoid making an analogy bet�een Prigogine’s criticism 
and the one �e are going to present ourselves from this point on. 
Briefly, �e �ill point out that, although it seems, from these ideas, 
as if the theories �ere neither true nor false, but �ere just rules that 
indicate ho� to make inferences on phenomena (Suppe 1974, 162)19, 
the fact that �e could falsify the theory � as it is, in short, an image �, 
does not mean that “a” reality does not underlie it. 
This is the case �ith economics. Economic theories are simulations, 
�hich sho� us the casual relations of phenomena. But in our classi�
fication of time, theories based on an image all share being products 
of imagination: the creative and living present, in three dimensions, 
underlies that simple fiction, including the idea that time is irrevers�
ible. The fact that living reality underlies the image makes �hatever 
imaginary theory contradictory and incoherent.
19 Mach (1960) shared �ith Berkeley (1951) and Hume (1964a) the conviction that it 
is a mistake to assume that concepts and relations of science have a correspondence �ith 
reality. Hume granted, for example, that atomist theories can be useful to describe some 
phenomena, but he insisted on the fact that this does not give us evidence of the existence 
of atoms in nature. Besides, if scientists �ant to preserve a generalisation at all costs, the 
fact that the la� cannot be contrasted �ill only lead to the temporal conclusion that the 
facts �ere imperfectly isolated from disturbing influences.
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Let us analyse in these terms the previous classification.
4.2. Discontinuity
Theories of the discontinuity of time, as discontinuous anarchism, 
try to destroy all human hierarchies. But, Proudhon, �ho considered 
government to be an authoritarian structure superimposed on soci�
ety, defended the substitution of private property of goods �ith their 
possession, according to the needs of social control. This �ill be pos�
sible only if �e set up a Po�er to impose the right to use goods and 
�hich possesses their “real” property.
That is to say, these anarchist theories make anarchism itself, order 
�ithout the State, impossible.
The necessary incoherence implicit in all discontinuist anarchist the�
ory leads their defenders to existentialism or nihilism; and to the in�
ability of accepting a social construction for fear of a�akening the 
authority phantom. They devote themselves to taking layers off life, 
as if searching for the core of an onion, until they become a�are of 
the fact that it �as only a trail of tears, and that nothing �ill be found 
in the centre.
In the foreseeable breaking of time, �e have set as an example Marx�
ian theory. But it must be said that the Marxian concept of history is 
itself alienated. Man is led by the inevitability of the future and by 
uncontrolled forces, a “non�human” science that �ill drive him to 
violence and to the Communist society20. In spite of his criticisms of 
anarchists, Marx also defended that the communist society, a priori 
not capable of definition, �ill be like the Paris Commune. According 
to Marx`s �ords, this �as the political form, finally discovered, in 
�hich it �ould be possible to base labour emancipation (Marx and 
Engels  1971). 
4.3. Continuity
With respect to continuism, historians of economic thought have not 
20 Berlin (1979) criticises this idea of historical inevitability that seems to imply that to 
“explain” is, in the last analysis, to justify, as the actions are supposed inevitable.
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yet defined the utility concept clearly enough to distinguish bet�een 
different theories. Here, �e �ill try to give a ne� and clearer defini�
tion of utilitarian action. 
Utilitarian action, it is said, seeks pleasure and tries to avoid pain. 
But it can be said that non�utilitarian action has also a common ele�
ment: the source of motivation is joy in the present, not pleasure; and 
joy only is provided by gratitude and disinterested concentration of 
“�hat it is”, �hich is shared by all men. In fact, in a critic stance �e 
�ill say that if a man tries to fit the �orld �ith an image of his desire, 
reality �ill not be perceived by him, but obstructed by his image. If 
�e could imagine an over�observer of all objects in the present, this 
over�observer �ould al�ays find that the universal reality is novelty 
�ithout cause and that it is not capable of individualisation21.
Ethics
Smith struggled against theories based on utility. He devoted himself 
to the construction of a complete social theory �hose basis confront�
ed the foundations of the theories that supposed that human action is 
based on the love of a mental system. That is to say, �e are not moved 
by a structure that our memory retains of longed�for pleasures and 
feared pain. But Humean passions are, precisely, based on that struc�
ture: on the habit of the association of ideas, threatened by the desire 
for survival and, in short, by the death instinct22. 
Utility, Smith says, is like beauty, something of little importance to 
his moral theory. We think that shapes that instinctively captivate us 
�ill provide us �ith a sensation of pleasure. Even cause and effect is a 
type of subtle beauty that greatly impresses men. They are impressed 
by the beauty of the animal and plant kingdom, the great natural eco�
system in �hich every element seems to fit like a great puzzle and 
every species is adapted to the niche for �hich it seems to have been 
created. That is to say, utility is, the same as imitative arts, beauty 
(Smith 1983).
21 Besides, also under a critic stance, �e can point out that pleasure depends on material 
and neural conditions and dispositions; joy does not; and that for joy to emerge, shared 
freedom is necessary; for pleasure it is not (see Trincado 2003).
22 Haakonssen (1981) and Vivenza (2001, 97�104) freed Smith’s moral and la� theories 
from the utilitarian label. The problem of Smith’s utilitarianism has also been set out in, 
amongst other �orks, Gris�old (1999, 540).
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Hume himself provided this conception of utility as a kind of beauty. 
Probably, Smith adopted this idea from his philosophical theory. So, 
although to Hume men act attracted by pleasure and try to avoid 
pain, his concept of utility is more pure and slightly different from the 
one that �ould become more �idespread later, �hich Bentham ac�
cepted. According to Hume, utility is not susceptible to the measure 
or comparison that Bentham made �ith the utilities of different men 
and, so, Hume`s theory is based on a collection of atomistic beauties 
perceived only subjectively23, and based on the idea of the spectator24. 
Bentham adhered Hume’s fiction theory and gave a special impor�
tance to language in the interpretation of reality and, even, in the 
creation of it25. But there is a great distance bet�een Hume`s and 
Bentham`s theory: there is a step bet�een the Humean philosophy 
of Being, and James Mill’s empirical psychology, �hich consists of 
neuronal attractions and repulsions producing pleasure or pain. In 
Chrestomatia, materialist Bentham’s theory can be made out. Bodies 
are constituted by masses of disperse matter, by big atoms encrusted 
in vacuum. Hume, on the contrary, had considered vacuum to be 
philosophically inconceivable, something that made it impossible for 
him to demonstrate the non�existence of vacuum.
La�
Hume’s legal system is based on the fear of the disappearance of so�
ciety in case of transgression of the la�. This can be matched �ith his 
theory of kno�ledge, in �hich it is concluded that the cause�effect 
relationship is only a fruit of our imagination and of habit. In that 
sense, our relationship to things, if they have identity in and of them�
selves, something that Hume could not assure, is so fragile that every 
ne� event can break it. As Burke said about the strong impression 
the death fear and our admiration for the Sublime produces in human 
23 Although the valuation mechanism of Hume’s ethics seems to imply an objectivity and 
ethical cognitivism (Tasset 1999, 74�86).
24 Haakonssen (1981, 41) calls Hume’s “utility of the means” as opposed to Bentham’s 
“utility of the ends”. But he does not make explicit �hether Hume �as a�are of this dis�
tinction or not.
25 In fact, he tried to create a language of his o�n to free �ords from the  “poisoned” 
connotations �hich they could have acquired in time. Other theorists have also tried to 
do this, introducing ne� �ords as “catallactics”  to name the market, etc... (Hayek 1988, 
110�112).
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mind: 
“The passions therefore �hich are conversant about the preserva�
tion of the individual turn chiefly on pain and danger, and they are 
the most po�erful of all the passions... No passion so effectually 
robs the mind of all its po�ers of action and reasoning as fear. For 
fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner 
that resembles actual pain” (Burke 1909, 36/51) 
As in Charles Dar�in`s theory later, evolution does not imply the as�
sumption of progress to something better, only the consciousness that 
the survivors, in their mutual dependence, �ill be the most suitable for 
the adaptation to the environment and possessors of a procreation ability 
(Sch�artz 1987)26.
Hume`s philosophical theory concluded that the cause � effect re�
lation and the kno�ledge itself are based on an imagination pro�
cess27, and that passion consists of mental movements of attrac�
tion and repulsion. But Smith thought that cause and effect had an 
entity of its o�n, and he had faith in the existence of an ordered 
external �orld. Bentham, on the contrary, although he accepted 
phenomenalism, could not assume Hume`s conclusions, and he 
said that Hume`s Treatise is a book... from which, however, in proportion 
to the bulk of it, no great quantity of useful instruction seemed derivable 
(Bentham 1983, 275).
Both Bentham`s certainty of the existence of the �orld and his confidence 
in human capacity to understand it, made him step for�ard and construct 
a theory, not based on the fear, but on the hope of progress. So, Bentham 
conceives of society as a great puzzle in �hich the pieces’ movement make 
the shapes fit and paints beauty predetermined by the very same construc�
tor of the game – let us say, the State.
We have already talked about Smith’s philosophical realism. But the same 
applies to natural la� (see Trincado 2004). Smith affirmed that the origin 
of justice is not to be found in utility, a discretional image of the future. 
Rather it is a natural feeling in human beings � felt in the present – that 
precedes the la�28. From human nature “emerges” indignation in the pres�
26 For contemporary anthropologic theories that defend utility as a survival determinant and 
reproductive category of socio�cultural systems, see Campbell (1985); or Harris (1983).
27 In this line are the authors that consider tradition to be a moderator of the possibilities of rea�
son, a sort of institutional apprenticeship based on an evolutionary epistemology (Hayek 1988).
28 Smithian justice is dealt �ith in Haakonssen (1981); Gris�old (1999); Vivenza (2001); or 
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ence of a crime committed against a loved one, despised under no circum�
stances by the criminal. La� only respects this feeling, it does not create 
it. This contradictory feeling of indignation to�ards the arrogance of the 
criminal, being natural, can be inhibited, but not eliminated. In this sense, 
Smith does not set himself as a judge: theory is about “being”, not about 
“�hat ought to be”. 
The origin of punishment is more a question of moral damage than of 
physical damage. It is inflicted, not to reduce pain or increase the pleasure 
of those affected, but based on the resentment of the relatives of the unre�
pentant criminal’s victim (Smith 1978, 104)29.
So, the foundation of la� is not a remote consideration of utility, �hich 
�ill use punishment of a man for an imaginary end. This image only gives 
justice �ith an artificial obscurity, �hen the feelings of a man �hose mor�
al sentiments have not been corrupted can, in general, judge the correct 
measure of punishment of crime.
So, then, at the moment man delegates justice, the judge can act according 
to t�o principles: according to the principle of authority or according to 
the principle of utility. If he acts according to the principle of authority, 
Po�er is exerted to make itself necessary and, in so doing, it tries to please 
both the injured and the criminal at the same time, by imposing injustice. 
When Po�er acts according to the utility principle, the State, seeking 
order and the prevention of natural resentment, establishes justice. In this 
last case, the judge imagines he puts himself in the place of the victim, the 
only �ay of not creating a feeling of impotence and rage at the system. The 
real problem is, then, ho� is it possible for the State to control its arbi�
trary po�er and act according to the principle of utility? Something that, 
in the final analysis, is impossible: �e have to rely on the ruler’s prudence. 
But, as Smith points out, I have never kno�n much good done by those 
�ho affected to trade for the publick good (Smith 1976, 456).
Actually, Smith , like Bentham, presented an idea of utopia. But, in 
Neusüss` (1968) terminology, Smith’s utopia is a “vertical” one, �hereas 
Bentham’s is “horizontal”. In the horizontal case, utopia �ill constitute 
the cro�ning of a linear development of history evolving to the supreme 
Trincado (2000).
29 Report of 1762�3, ii, 90.
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good. In the vertical, utopia �ill act perpendicularly across historical pro�
cess, rene�ing at every instant the contrast bet�een reality and the ideal, 
fragmenting the accomplishment of utopian intention. Nevertheless, it is 
not compulsory to think that utopia �ill definitely be achieved. The first 
utopian ideal is teleological; the second one, ethical.
Economics
With respect to economics, the differences bet�een Hume’s and Ben�
tham’s theories and that of Smith are based on their different concep�
tions of utility; of freedom; of order; and of time... We do not intend to 
describe here thoroughly these three economic theories, as that analysis 
is beyond the scope of this paper. But �e �ould like, at least, to point out 
the non�utilitarian character of Smithian economic theory. 
Smithian division of labour is more a result of a game or a creative incli�
nation, keen on finding reality, that a product of an individual or social 
anticipation. Besides, in Smith’s theory the positive consequence of �ealth 
creation and economic gro�th is not that it increases the quantity of “hap�
piness” �hich money makes available, but the joy it creates, and the pos�
sibility of “breaking” a habit, enjoying the feeling of curiosity and... the 
construction of a continuous conception of time. That is not a pleasure: 
joy does not seek a foreseen image but is, precisely, freeing yourself from 
an image. In fact, it seeks nothing. It is there, �aiting in the open space for 
man to “let himself ” enjoy the company of present beings. With respect to 
the entrepreneur, it cannot be doubted that the Schumpeterian creative 
entrepreneur or, more recently, Kirzner’s, sho�s an antiutilitarian ver�
sion. But Smith feared any admiration of that entrepreneurial “creativity”: 
Bentham’s projector risks the accumulation of capital only to seek an image 
of its mind. This image could be projects, in certain cases too risky, �hich 
only seek to satiate the pride of ordering or directing labour.
Coase posed that State justice or entrepreneurial hierarchy (be it a dic�
tatorial or a democratic one) exist because hierarchy reduces transaction 
costs in relation to market or damages compensations. This hypothesis is 
used no�adays in the Business Theory. Ho�ever, imposing a mental sys�
tem al�ays implies the elimination of the possibility of letting oneself be 
led by a non�functional creation. And, for Smith, that is due precisely to 
the fact that it is impossible to give an external incentive to creative la�
bour, much less through punishment. The creative action is not a thought�
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ful or pondered action: it simply emerges. Transactions reduce their o�n 
costs, but “�ithout thinking about it” and because men’s actions seek to 
“raise” themselves over the costs and surpass them, as a �ay of creating 
and enjoying, in the present, the side of economy that is like a game (see 
Trincado 2007).
5. Summing-up and Conclusion
In economics, theorists suffer from a suspicion that mainstream science 
uses methods of persuasion, supported by Po�er, to eliminate all ele�
ments critical of the dominant paradigm. We have indeed presented a 
classification of economic thought based on time that sho�s the picture 
of a methodological anarchism; and �e have sho�ed some philosophical, 
social and economic ideas that emerge from the proposed classification. 
Its mental fertility makes it possible to compare totally different theories. 
Our proposal of classification has been based on the psychological person�
al experience of time, �hich determines the images “rhetoricians” seek 
to persuade �ith. Memory but also oblivion, have been emphasized. We 
have firstly used the traditional distinction bet�een continuism – discon�
tinuism. Discontinuity can be illustrated in the form of a constant break�
ing of time, as is the case in some anarchist doctrines; or a foreseeable 
breaking of time, as is the case �ith the catastrophic crises theories or �ith 
Marxian theory. In the theories based on the continuity of time, �e have 
posed a distinction bet�een three branches: the first based on the past, the 
second based on the present, and third based on the future. Specifically, 
�e have named each branch, first, conservatism based on utility; second, 
creative present (non utilitarianism); and, third, utilitarian progressism. 
We have offered a “prototypical” example for each of these tendencies: in 
the case of conservatism, Hume’s theory; in that of progressist utilitarian�
ism, the philosophy of Bentham; finally, in the case of non�utilitarianism, 
Smith`s system (and �e have enlarged here our proposal to “present liv�
ing” philosophy).
As �e have said, although it seems, from conventionalism, as if the theo�
ries �ere neither true nor false, but just rules that indicate ho� to make 
inferences on phenomena, the fact that �e could falsify the theory, does 
not mean that “a” reality does not underlie it. In our classification of time, 
theories based on an image all share being products of imagination. The 
fact that living reality underlies the image makes �hatever imaginary the�
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ory contradictory and incoherent.
It is our hope that �e continue to sho� the fertile possibilities of broad 
application of this classification.
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